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Abstract. From 06.04. to 09.04.2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10141 Dis-
tributed Usage Control  was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center
for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their
current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed.
Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as ab-
stracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The
ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to
extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Usage control, access control, data protection, privacy, se-
curity policies, trust, trusted computing, compliance, DRM, information
ﬂow
Dagstuhl Seminar 10141: Distributed Usage Control
We summarize Dagstuhl seminar 10141 on Distributed Usage Control.
Keywords: Usage control, access control, data protection, privacy, security
policies, trust, trusted computing, compliance, DRM, information ﬂow
Joint work of: Etalle, Sandro; Pretschner, Alexander; Sandhu, Ravi; Winslett,
Marianne
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2717
FORTES: Forensic Information Flow Analysis of Business
Processes
Rafael Accorsi (Universität Freiburg, DE)
Nearly 70% of all business processes in use today rely on automated workﬂow
systems for their execution.
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Despite the growing expenses in the design of advanced tools for secure and
compliant deployment of workﬂows, an exponential growth of dependability in-
cidents persists. Concepts beyond access control focusing on information ﬂow
control oﬀer new paradigms to design security mechanisms for reliable and se-
cure IT-based workﬂows.
This talk presents FORTES, an approach for the forensic analysis of informa-
tion ﬂow properties. FORTES claims that information ﬂow control can be made
usable as a core of an audit-control system. For this purpose, it reconstructs
workﬂow models from secure log ﬁles (i.e. execution traces) and, applying secu-
rity policies, analyzes the information ﬂows to distinguish security relevant from
security irrelevant information ﬂows. FORTES thus cannot prevent security pol-
icy violations, but by detecting them with well-founded analysis, improve the
precision of audit controls and the generated certiﬁcates.
Keywords: Audit, Information ﬂow analysis, business processes
Joint work of: Accorsi, Rafael; Müller, Günter
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2716
Taking Authorization Logics Beyond Access Control
Lujo Bauer (Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, US)
Authorization logics have proven to be a useful tool for modeling and building
distributed accesscontrol systems. In this talk, I will discuss some advances in
authorization logics that move this approach towards being able to reason about
and implement usage-control scenarios.
First, I will present a method for implementing consumable credentials using
authorization logic.
Such credentials convey use-limited authority (e.g., to open a door once) or
authority to utilize resources that are themselves limited (e.g., concert tickets).
I will brieﬂy describe design and implementation of mechanisms to enforce the
consumption of credentials in a distributed system, and to protect credentials
from nonproductive consumption as might result from misbehavior or failure.
Second, I will brieﬂy survey several other recent advancements in authoriza-
tion logics that make them more suitable for use in real-world usage-control
scenarios. These include a method for signiﬁcantly reducing the latencies and
overhead typically associated with formal proofs of access, and extensions to au-
thorization logics to support DRM-style control over the usage of digital content.
Distributed Usage Control 3
Distributed Privacy Policy Enforcement
David Chadwick (University of Kent, GB)
We propose a system in which a user's personal policy is submitted along with
their personal identifying information (PII), and this policy is thereafter stuck to
their PII whilst it is used by the original organisation and any other organisations
that it is subsequently transferred to. The handling of the sticky policy and the
policy enforcement is taken care of by an application independent authorisation
infrastructure, so that existing applications need to make very few changes to
their existing code in order to support distributed sticky policy enforcement.
Keywords: Sticky policies, privacy protection, usage control
Joint work of: Chadwick, David; Fatema, Kaniz
Adding Privacy Support to a Rights Language
Renato Iannella (NICTA - St. Lucia, AU)
The Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) has evolved over the past decade
into a general policy language. Its original form was biased towards the DRM
market, but now has been generalised towards a broader, and open, community.
The current Version 2.0 Model supports both Permissions and Prohibitions, both
with Constraints. The new Duty (ie Obligations) now supports the assignment
of the responsible Parties.
As a general Policy language, ODRL has the ability to support Privacy se-
mantics. In particular, the typical Privacy use cases from Social Networks. These
are generally faceted around access control to your friends, groups, and friends
of friends, for example. Traditional Privacy semantics, such as Purpose and Re-
tention, can also be supported.
A new Social Networks initiative - the OneSocialWeb - has proposed an
XMPP-based architecture to cover; Social Activities - sharing, archiving and
retrieving generic activities/content; Social Proﬁle - sharing and querying user
proﬁles; Social Relationships - establishing, sharing, conﬁrming social relation-
ships between users;and Social Notiﬁcations - exchanging, storing and retrieving
generic notiﬁcation messages. We will be extending ODRL to support some of the
ﬁne-grained access control and privacy expressions required by OneSocialWeb.
Keywords: Privacy, ODRL, Social Networks
Full Paper:
http://renato.iannella.it
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Monitoring Security Policies with Metric First-Order
Temporal Logic
Felix Klaedtke (ETH Zürich, CH)
We show the practical feasibility of monitoring complex security properties using
a runtime monitoring approach for metric ﬁrst-order temporal logic. In particu-
lar, we show how a wide variety of security policies can be naturally formalized in
this expressive logic, ranging from traditional policies like Chinese wall and sep-
aration of duty to more specialized usage-control and compliance requirements.
We also explain how these formalizations can be directly used for monitoring
and experimentally evaluate the performance of the resulting monitors.
Joint work with David Basin and Samuel Mueller.
Keywords: Temporal Logic, Monitoring, Security Policies, Access Control, Sep-





Privacy Wizards for Social Networking Sites
Kristen LeFevre (University of Michigan, US)
Privacy is an enormous problem in online social networking sites.
While sites such as Facebook allow users ﬁne-grained control over who can see
their proﬁles, it is diﬃcult for average users to specify this kind of detailed policy.
For this reason, we propose a template for the design of a social networking
privacy wizard. The intuition for the design comes from the observation that
real users conceive their privacy preferences (which friends should be able to
see which information) based on an implicit set of rules. Thus, with a limited
amount of user input, it is usually possible to build a machine learning model
that concisely describes a particular user's preferences, and then use this model
to conﬁgure the user's privacy settings automatically.
As an instance of this general framework, we have built a wizard based on an
active learning paradigm called uncertainty sampling. The wizard iteratively asks
the user to assign privacy labels" to selected (informative") friends, and it uses
this input to construct a classiﬁer, which can in turn be used to automatically
assign privileges to the rest of the user's (unlabeled) friends.
To evaluate our approach, we collected detailed privacy preference data from
45 real Facebook users. Our study revealed two important things. First, real
users tend to conceive their privacy preferences in terms of communities, which
can easily be extracted from a social network graph using existing techniques.
Second, our active learning wizard, using communities as features, is able to
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recommend high- accuracy privacy settings using less user input than existing
policyspeciﬁcation tools.
Enforcement of Individual Privacy Policies by
Communication Service Providers
Michael Marhoefer (Nokia Siemens Networks - München, DE)
This talk has two parts:
1. Report on adding Individual Privacy Policies to NSN's Research Prototype
for IDM
2. Challenge for Research in Access/Usage Control: "How to control in Web
2.0 the ﬂow of PII bypassing today's IDM"
Keywords: Privacy identity IdP browser online-privacy Web 2.0 Communica-
tion Service Provider
Joint work of: Michael Marhoefer and Robert Seidl (with contributions by
NSN's IDM community)
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2715
Infringement Management: or why Schneider, Hamlen,
Bauer, Ligatti, Walker, and many others are all looking in
the wrong place
Fabio Massacci (University of Trento - Povo, IT)
There are many papers around on how to enforce security policies by means of
security, insertion, suppression, edit, [a-z]*-automata. They are based on two sim-
ple ideas: the enforcement mechanism should leave good executions unchanged
(transparency) and Bad execution should be made good (soundness).
Practical systems deal with bad and good traces in *some* ways but the
theoretical models have so far concentrated only on the characterization of good
traces for this or that enforcement mechanism. Unfortunately, from a practical
perspective, these are the most uninteresting properties ever. What makes a
diﬀerence in practice is not what the enforcement mechanism does when the
doctors follows the hospital's policy (because nothing should be done!) but when
they start to misbehave. But we have no theory for it!
This problem is a source of huge paradoxes. A black-hole system (silently ig-
noring the doctor's requests until he remember to insert the clinical trial number
in a past prescription) or the heads-up system (notify the head nurse that they
forgot to insert it) cannot be formally distinguished. Even the very running ex-
ample of Bauer, Ligatti and Walker's IJIS paper cannot be geneerated following
the theoretical construction (of IJIS or TISSEC papers).
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I will try in this talk provide some foundation for more practical enforce-
ment theories based on the notions of infringement management with venial and
amendable errors.
Joint work of: Massacci, Fabio; Bielova, Nataliia
Diﬀerential Privacy: Theory and Practice
Frank McSherry (Microsoft Research - Mountain View, US)
We present an introduction to the recent concept of Diﬀerential Privacy", a
privacy criterion requiring that a computation not reveal the presence or absence
of individual records in an input data set. After developing the mathematical
foundation, we proceed to describe the Privacy Integrated Queries" platform, an
analysis language and system providing diﬀerential privacy guarantees even for
users without privacy experience. The platform requires some new mathematics,
tasteful language restriction, and careful implementation, but enables a large set
of new computations that would otherwise require ad-hoc expert analysis before
execution against sensitive data.
Securely Managing Historical Retention in Database
Systems
Gerome Miklau (University of Massachusets - Amherst, US)
Databases that preserve a historical record of their operations and data oﬀer
the important beneﬁt of system accountability: past events can be analyzed to
detect breaches and maintain data quality. But the retention of history can also
pose a threat to privacy. System designers must carefully balance the need for
privacy and accountability by controlling how and when data is retained by the
system, and who will be able to recover it.
This talk addresses two challenges to securely managing historical data. First,
databases don't easily "forget". Even when users intend to remove sensitive
information, it may persist against their will. We report experimental results
on this unintended retention and propose solutions. Second, while databases
can "remember", they don't remember safely. Few tools exists for managing an
intended audit record in a manner consistent with retention policies. We describe
a framework in which audit logs can be protected and audit queries are answered
approximately.
Keywords: Retention policy, forensics, databases
Joint work of: Miklau, Gerome; Lu, Wentian; Stahlberg, Patrick; Levine, Brian
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.umass.edu/∼miklau/pubs/icde09/lu09auditing.pdf
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Trust Management Models for Distributed Usage Control
Ricardo Neisse (Fraunhofer IESE - Kaiserslautern, DE)
Distributed usage control is concerned with the governance of who is autho-
rized to access a piece of data and rights and duties that must be enforced
after data is released. When enforcing distributed usage control policies, dif-
ferent trust aspects should be considered, for example, the integrity of system
components that enforce usage control policies, and the identities of the parties
that exchange data. In this talk I will introduce our work on trust management
for distributed usage control and the future research directions we are pursu-
ing. Our work builds up on trust guarantees realized using Trusted Computing
Platform and integrates with other trust issues considering the goals and depen-
dencies of the diﬀerent parties that interact and exchange data. The initial focus
of our work is on trust issues related to distributed usage control in service ori-
ented and cloud computing architectures. Our long term objective is to specify
an abstract trust management model and identify trust management patterns to
support decision and risk analysis considering data usage control in a distributed
computing scenario.
Keywords: Trust management usage control
Noninterference through secure multi-execution
Frank Piessens (K.U. Leuven, BE)
A program is deﬁned to be noninterferent if its outputs cannot be inﬂuenced
by inputs at a higher security level than their own. Various researchers have
demonstrated how this property (or closely related properties) can be achieved
through information ﬂow analysis, using either a static analysis (with a type
system or otherwise), or using a dynamic monitoring system.
We propose an alternative approach, based on a technique we call secure
multi-execution. The main idea is to execute a program multiple times, once
for each security level, using special rules for I/O operations. Outputs are only
produced in the execution linked to their security level. Inputs are replaced by
default inputs except in executions linked to their security level or higher. Input
side eﬀects are supported by making higher-security-level executions reuse inputs
obtained in lower-security-level threads.
We show that this approach is interesting from both a theoretical and prac-
tical viewpoint. Theoretically, we prove for a simple deterministic language with
I/O operations, that this approach guarantees complete soundness (even for the
timing and termination covert channels), as well as good precision (identical I/O
for terminating runs of termination-sensitively noninterferent programs).
On the practical side, we present an experiment implementing secure multi-
execution in the mainstream Spidermonkey Javascript engine, exploiting paral-
lelism on a current multi-core computer. Benchmark results of execution time
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and memory for the Google Chrome v8 Benchmark suite show that the approach
is practical for a mainstream browser setting. Certain programs are even exe-
cuted faster under secure multi-execution than under the standard execution.
We discuss challenges and propose possible solutions for implementing the
technique in a real browser, in particular handling the DOM tree and browser
callback functions.
Finally, we discuss how secure multi-execution can be extended to handle
language features like exceptions, concurrency or nondeterminism.
Keywords: Noninterference, information ﬂow, security




Towards Static Flow-based Declassiﬁcation for Legacy and
Untrusted Programs
Bruno Pontes Soares Rocha (TU Eindhoven, NL)
Simple non-interference is too restrictive for specifying and enforcing information
ﬂow policies in most programs.
Exceptions to non-interference are provided using declassiﬁcation policies.
Several approaches for enforcing declassiﬁcation have been proposed in the lit-
erature. In most of these approaches, the declassiﬁcation policies are embedded
in the program itself or heavily tied to the variables in the program being ana-
lyzed, thereby providing little separation between the code and the policy. Con-
sequently, the previous approaches essentially require that the code be trusted,
since to trust that the correct policy is being enforced, we need to trust the
source code.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework in which declassiﬁcation policies
are related to the source code being analyzed via its I/O channels. The framework
supports many of the of declassiﬁcation policies identiﬁed in the literature.
Based on ﬂow-based static analysis, it represents a ﬁrst step towards a new
approach that can be applied to untrusted and legacy source code to automati-
cally verify that the analyzed program complies with the speciﬁed declassiﬁcation
policies. The analysis works by constructing a conservative approximation of ex-
pressions over input channel values that could be output by the program, and
by determining whether all such expressions satisfy the declassiﬁcation require-
ments stated in the policy. We introduce a representation of such expressions
that resembles tree automata. We prove that if a program is considered safe
according to our analysis then it satisﬁes a property we call Policy Controlled
Release, which formalizes information-ﬂow correctness according to our notion
of declassiﬁcation policy.
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We demonstrate, through examples, that our approach works for several in-
teresting and useful declassiﬁcation policies, including one involving declassiﬁ-
cation of the average of several conﬁdential values.
Keywords: Information Flow, Declassiﬁcation, Untrusted code
Usage Control meets Information Flow
Alexander Pretschner (TU Kaiserslautern, DE)
Major technologies for usage control enforcement include runtime veriﬁcation
and complex event processing. The universe of discourse of respective policies is
that of events. If usage control is deﬁned as access control that extends to the
future and, in a distributed setting, is deﬁned to concern the usage of data after
giving it away, there is a mismatch: Policies primarily pertain to events while
usage control requirements primarily pertain to data. Our work aims at making
usage control more data-centric: rather than stipulating that ﬁle song1.mp3 must
not be played after 31st of December, want to specify (and enforce) that the song
(the data) that corresponds to (the ﬁle) song1.mp3 must not be played after 12-
31. In particular, all copies of ﬁle song1.mp3 must not be played after that date.
In order to enforce this kind of requirements, we hence need to track copies of ﬁle
song1.mp3 at and across diﬀerent layers of abstraction (e.g., operating system,
runtime system, window system, sound hardware). This can be achieved by data
ﬂow tracking systems.
In this talk, we show how to marry usage control to information ﬂow and
present a set of fundamental technical and conceptual challenges.
This is the result of oint work with Enrico Lovat, Matus Harvan, Christian
Schaefer, and Thomas Walter.
Keywords: Usage control, information ﬂow
Group-Centric Models for Secure and Agile Information
Sharing
Ravi S. Sandhu (Univ. of Texas at San Antonio, US)
To share information and retain control (share-but-protect) is a classic cyber
security problem for which eﬀective solutions continue to be elusive.
Where the patterns of sharing are well deﬁned and slow to change it is reason-
able to apply the traditional access control models of lattice-based, role-based
and attribute-based access control, along with discretionary authorization for
further ﬁne-grained control as required. Proprietary and standard rights markup
languages have been developed to control what a legitimate recipient can do
with the received information including control over its further discretionary
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dissemination. This dissemination-centric approach oﬀers considerable ﬂexibil-
ity in terms of controlling a particular information object with respect to already
deﬁned attributes of users, subjects and objects.
However, it has many of the same or similar problems that discretionary
access control manifests relative to role-based access control. In particular speci-
fying information sharing patterns beyond those supported by currently deﬁned
authorization attributes is cumbersome or infeasible. Recently a novel mode
of information sharing called group-centric was introduced by me and my col-
leagues.
Group-centric secure information sharing (g-SIS) is designed to be agile and
accommodate ad hoc patterns of information sharing. In this lecture we review
g-SIS models, discuss their relationship with traditional access control models
and demonstrate their agility relative to these.
Privacy in Ubiquitous Mobile Services
Christian Schaefer (DOCOMO Euro-Labs - München, DE)
The scenario considered is future mobile networks where it is envisioned that
many more enhanced services will be available for mobile users than today and
in a functionally much wider scope. The services are composed by service enablers
which provide some speciﬁc functionality. Service enablers by third parties might
also be used to provide some speciﬁc service. This means that the third party
might need some private data to provide the required results. A user giving away
his private data might wish to have some means to control how his private data
will be used.
The goal of the proposed work is to provide an environment where users can
distribute private data and be sure that these data is handled according to some
privacy policy they have speciﬁed. The presentation will cover the necessary
areas of work one has to deal with to solve this problem and concentrate on the
planned work items.
To provide an environment where private data is protected it is envisioned to
use former work on distributed usage control as basis. Thus it is necessary to de-
velop an enforcement infrastructure that is able to provide the desired protection
for the user's private data. Some of the topics that need to be considered are
the enforcement architecture, identity management, data/policy management,
protocols for data/policy exchange (also within the enforcement architecture if
you consider a distributed infrastructure), some kind of "speciﬁcation language"
for enforcement mechanisms and other topics.
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GEM: a Distributed Goal Evaluation Algorithm for Trust
Management
Daniel Trivellato (TU Eindhoven, NL)
Trust Management (TM) is an approach to access control in distributed systems,
where access decisions are based on policy statements made by multiple prin-
cipals and stored in a distributed manner. Most of the existing goal evaluation
algorithms for TM either rely on a centralized evaluation strategy, which col-
lects all the relevant policy statements in a single location (and therefore does
not guarantee the conﬁdentiality of intensional policies), or do not detect the
termination of the computation. In this paper we present GEM, a distributed
goal evaluation algorithm for TM systems. GEM detects when the computation
has terminated (i.e., all the answers of a goal are computed) in a completely
distributed way without the need of disclosing intensional policies, thereby pre-
serving their conﬁdentiality.
Keywords: Trust management, distributed goal evaluation
Joint work of: Trivellato, Daniel; Etalle, Sandro; Winsborough, William H.;
Zannone, Nicola
Methodological considerations for the design of
group-based secure information sharing systems
Willliam H. Winsborough (Univ. of Texas at San Antonio, US)
This talk considers methodological issues with application to the design of group-
based secure information sharing models. Our approach combines several design
steps, each intended to focus the attention of the designer on diﬀerent aspects of
the larger system. The basic approach is to use temporal logic to specify system
behavior. This enables us to focus on basic group operationsa user joining a
group, user leaving, object being added to a group, object removal from a group,
group creation and destruction, subject creation and destruction. Administrative
policies will be needed to govern some of these operations. The fundamental
principle is that users gain access to objects by virture of belonging to groups
in which the object is present. Several variations of join, leave, add, and remove
have been studied, and various inter-group relationships are currently under
investigation. The key system behavior is that of authorization for a user or his
subject to be granted access to an object. Behavior of users and administrators
is given by the join, leave, add and remove events.
Methodologically, the ﬁrst steps involve the simultaneous design of core prop-
erties that focus on one aspect of system behavior at a time. This provides
a sanity check that enables the designer to consider each facet of the system
in isolation. The second codiﬁes these properties into a single speciﬁcation of
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the circumstances in which subject creation, object read and write are autho-
rized, based directly on past join, leave, add, remove, object and subject creation
events. Core properties are veriﬁed to be satisﬁed by this (stateless) speciﬁca-
tion. Working on a reﬁnement basis, the third develops (stateful) data structures
that veriﬁably support identical authorization decisions as the stateless speci-
ﬁcation. The fourth considers issues arising due to distributed implementation
and non-instantaneous communication. These considerations prevent developing
a speciﬁcation that is a pure reﬁnement of the stateful speciﬁcation. Notions of
stale-safety are introduced, and alternative enforcement-level policy options are
discussed.
Risk-aware usage control
Artsiom Yautsiukhin (CNR - Pisa, IT)
We started a research line devoted to consider the notion of risk in the Usage
Control (UCON). This can be considered from several perspectives.
In particular, UCON is based on the idea that attributes required for decision-
making can be changed over a period of usage. It is not always possible to get a
fresh and trustworthy value of attributes, and a decision has to be done with some
uncertainties in mind. Our study concerns the risks associated with imperfect
mechanisms collecting information about an authorization context.
We use Continuous-time Markov Chains to solve the problem.
The other direction is to help a client to assess the riskiness of data processing
while client's data is under control of a service provider in Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA). We propose a method to empower usage control decision
making process for more eﬃcient and ﬂexible control of access to data. We show
how to select a service provider using risk, re-evaluate the risk level when some
changes have happened and how to improve an infrastructure in order to reduce
the risk level.
Qualitative risk assessment is used to tackle the problem.
